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During the first year of President Trump’s mandate, few decisions 
were taken involving the adoption of protectionist measures, 
despite the stress on this issue during the election campaign.1 
However, since March of this year, the US administration has been 
much more active in this area, and has adopted some markedly 
protectionist measures.
The first significant action, taken in March 2018, consisted in 
raising the tariffs on US steel and aluminium imports to 25% and 
10%, respectively. South Korea, Argentina, Australia and Brazil 
were exempted from these tariffs under bilateral agreements. 
China, one of the countries affected, adopted retaliatory measures 
applicable to imports from the United States with a value of $3 
billion. Meanwhile, Canada, Mexico and the European Union (EU) 
were temporarily exempt, until 1 June, when this exemption was 
revoked, prompting the announcement by their authorities of 
retaliatory measures affecting imports from the United States 
worth $23 billion. The amounts affected by these measures may 
seem large, but it is widely agreed that their direct impact will be 
relatively small, since the goods currently affected account for a 
low proportion of total trade flows (see Chart 1).2 However, the 
indirect impact of the tariffs may be greater,  since, among other 
reasons, when they are applied to intermediate goods used as 
inputs in the productive process, they may affect the shape of 
global production chains.   
In mid-June, trade tensions soared when the US presidency 
announced the imposition of 25% tariffs on imports from China of 
1,100 products worth $50 billion. The reason given for this measure 
was the alleged unlawful appropriation of US intellectual property 
by Chinese firms.3 The Chinese authorities responded by 
announcing retaliatory measures with an equivalent value, involving 
the introduction of 25% tariffs on more than 650 US products.4 
In Chart 2, the blue bars show the sectoral breakdown of the 
bilateral exports between the United States and China (as a 
percentage of their total bilateral trade flows) and the red bars the 
proportion of such exports that would be affected by the new 
tariffs. Overall, these measures (applied to trade flows worth $100 
billion) would affect around 15% of bilateral trade flows. Within 
each sector, the new 25% tariffs would involve a significant 
increase in those currently in force (the diamonds in Chart 2), 
especially in the case of the tariffs faced by Chinese exporters.
In order to estimate the impact of this escalation of protectionist 
measures on the GDP and inflation of various economies, two 
simulations have been performed using the NIGEM global 
econometric model. The first one is a simulation of the effects of 
this recent increase to 25% in the duties applied to imports worth 
$100 billion ($50 billion in each direction of the bilateral trade 
between China and the United States). The second simulation 
also involves tariffs of 25% on Chinese imports from the United 
States worth $50 billion, with the amount affected in the other 
direction being much larger ($150 billion).5 The results show that 
the US economy will be the most affected (see Chart 3). 
Specifically, its GDP, after four years, will be 0.2 pp lower than in 
the baseline scenario in the first simulation and more than 0.5 pp 
lower in the second. The adverse effects on China will be smaller, 
since the tariffs affect a smaller proportion of its total exports. As 
for third countries, the impact will be greatest in Canada and 
Mexico, given their close trade ties with the United States, and 
somewhat lower in the euro area, Japan and the rest of Asia. 
Moreover, since higher duties will push up the price level, the 
inflation rate is forecast to rise in all the economies, as seen in 
Chart 4.6 These estimates may understate the total effects, as 
they are based on simulations that only consider the trade 
channel, and therefore ignore others, such as a possible negative 
impact on confidence or the generation of tensions in financial 
markets that may result in higher financing costs.
Looking ahead, there is great uncertainty surrounding the adoption 
of further measures. As regards the bilateral relations between the 
United States and China, the most likely scenario, following the 
latest decisions, is no longer one of agreement between these two 
economies, as appeared to be implied by the agreement in 
principle reached in May, with the commitment on the part of 
China to increase its imports of goods and services from the 
United States.
The future of trade relations between the United States and other 
economies is also uncertain, with the EU and Mexico and Canada 
having declared their readiness to respond to any protectionist 
measures that may be taken by the United States, such as those 
that may arise from the investigation commenced in mid-May by 
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1  The measures adopted during the first year of the president’s mandate 
were primarily in the form of executive orders designed to increase 
purchases of US goods and services (such as the “Buy American, Hire 
American” order of April 2017, addressed to government agencies) or to 
investigate the effectiveness and consequences of international trade 
agreements of which the United States is a signatory.
2  Specifically, the US steel and aluminium imports subject to the new 
duties and the US exports affected by the reprisal measures amount, 
respectively, to only 1.8% and 1.7% of the total imports and exports of 
this country. In terms of the impact on US GDP, Barclays (2018), The 
Trade-Offs of Free Trade estimates that the new duties on aluminium 
and steel may reduce it by somewhat less than 0.2 pp in the short term, 
while Sposi and Virdi (2018) “Steeling the U.S. Economy for the Impact 
of Tariffs,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Letter, estimate a 
reduction of 0.25 pp in the long term.
3  The new measures would affect the imports of high-technology 
goods, and electronic and chemical products, aircraft parts, medicines 
and machinery.
4  The products affected include soya (among other agricultural products), 
motor vehicles, chemical products and aircraft.
5  The reason is that the president of the United States has threatened to 
impose duties on an additional flow of $100 billion of imports from 
China, if China retaliates, which it has done.
6  It is assumed in these simulations that the monetary authorities react to 
trade restrictions by changing interest rates in response to the rise in 
inflation and the reduction in activity.
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the US Department of Commerce to determine whether vehicle 
imports pose a threat to national security. The results of this 
investigation may lead to the imposition of elevated duties on such 
imports, which would affect the EU (especially Germany and Italy) 
and Japan in particular. Canada and Mexico would also be 
severely affected, both directly and through the effects on the 
renegotiation of the terms of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) which was initiated at the beginning of the 
current US presidency. Thus, in the present circumstances, a 
further escalation in the adoption of protectionist measures, 
representing a risk to growth in trade and global activity, cannot be 
ruled out.7 
7  ECB, Economic Bulletin, May 2018, Box 1 (“Implications of rising trade 
tensions for the global economy”) contains simulations of scenarios in 
which protectionist measures spread, as a result of imposition by the 
United States of significant duties on imports from all countries and of 
equivalent retaliatory measures by the latter, with a pronounced impact 
on global activity.
SOURCES: US Census Bureau, IMF DOTS, Peterson Institute for International Economics, US International Trade Commission, WTO and BdE simulations using 
NIGEM.
a By China, Canada, Mexico and the EU.
b Exports of each sector: % of exports of each country.
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